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CITATIONS TO TRANSCRIPTS
There are two transcripts in this matter:

a transcript of

the evidentiary hearing held on March 21, 1987 and a transcript
of the closing arguments on April 9, 1987.

The transcript of the

evidentiary hearing will be referred to a^ "March Tr." and the
transcript of the closing argument will be(referred to as "April
Tr,".

Pages and line numbers will be designated by decimals

(.)

so that a reference to page 3, line 11, will appear as 3.11.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 2, 1987, the lower Court is|sued an Order to Show
Cause requiring Defendant to appear before |the Court on March 24,
1987, to show cause why certain orders shodld not be entered with
respect to visitation and the interpretation of provisions of the
1

Decree of Divorce relating to child support. (R. 303).
The basis of the Order to Show Cause was an affidavit
submitted by Defendant (R. 244) wherein Defendant stated, among
other things, that:
(a)

Plaintiff had refused to allow him visitation with the

minor children by constantly claiming unavailability of the
children by reason of prior plans made by Plaintiff;
(b)

Plaintiff had falsely claimed arrearages in child

support payments and had sought and obtained assistance from the
Office of Recovery
procedures.

Services who had

initiated

enforcement

At the hearing on the Order to Show Cause, Defendant

proffered evidence in support of these claims (March Tr. 4.17;
10.3; 10.15; 10.24 & 11.6).
The Order to Show Cause further claimed interference in the
sale of the family home.

However, those issues are now moot

insofar as this appeal is concerned.
The basis of the dispute with respect to child support
arrearages was that Plaintiff interpreted paragraphs 7 and 8 of
the Divorce Decree to provide that in the event of Plaintiff's
remarriage, Defendant was obligated

to continue making the

mortgage payments on the family and also to simultaneously
increase child support in a sum equal to two-thirds of the
mortgage payment.
unilaterally

Under Plaintiff's interpretation, which was

conceived

and not submitted

to the Court

for

approval, Defendant would have been seriously in arrears in child
support payments in a sum equal to one-third of the monthly
2

m o r t g a g e p a y m e n t s i n c e P l a i n t i f f f s r e m a r r i a g e in A u g u s t , 1 9 8 4 .
With respect tu till: le cl :i,:i I d suppor t: i ssi ie, Defendai 1 t: coi it e n d e d
that paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Decree provided that: in the event
of

Plaintiff's

house payment

remarriage, Defendant's

obligation

wuulml cuds^ w "'

obligation to pay child suppon

r.-M .
i.n : -sn

to make

the

rease in his

<j'iu,ij z>. rwo-thirds of

the house payment.
At tl le hearing on Marct . .

I1 -

•-•' :n..lated

oth par* >.

that t h e r e l e v a n t facts could b e p r o f f e r e d and if m e r e
to ht» .I dispute

appeared

in U" n Facts, e i t h e r partyl could call witnesses

to t e s t i f y (March T r . 3,13 to 3 . 2 0 ) ,

T h e p r o f f e r s w e r e received

by the Court and both of the p a r t i e s t e s t i f i e d c o n c e r n i n g
i: e I a t L n g

At

I! i m

the

opportunity

' i. s I!: a 1". i <.> i i.

hearing

-- March

24,

to present evidence.

1987, each

party

However |, Plaintiff

had

On or about April

.:

:9b

full

requested

leave to f::i ] e a memor ai ldi lm ai id sucl i ] eav e w as gi an ted.
19.10)

facts

( March Tr.

nin^ (9) days after

the

evidentiary hearing, Plaintiff submitted an a f f i d a v i t r a t h e r than
a

memorandum

proffer

(R,

31 1 ) ,

of a d d i t i o n a l

concluded

anil Defendant

(April T r . V . 1 8 ) .

Defendant

facts

inasmuch

objected

to

1:1 le

untimely

as t h e h e a r i n g

had been

w.is nn.ilhlp tu tile a o p p o s i n g

affidavit

T h e C o u r t m a d e a d e c i s i o n on

the m e a n i n g o f

p a r a g r a p h s 7 and 8 oi the D e c r e e w i t h o u t r u l i n g o n t h e o b j e c t i o n
(Apr i I Tr

.'! , J

"J

In .'I ,' ) .

O n A p r i l 2 1 , 1 9 8 7 , t h e Court e n t e r e d i t s O r d e r in t h e m a t t e r
(hereinafter

"Subject O r d e r " ) .

A copy of t h e S u b j e c t O r d e r is

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
BETTINGER vs. BETT1NGER
Civil NO.87-0500-CA
Point I Summary
The Subject Order did not constitute a J modification of the
Decree of Divorce so as to require the filing of a petition for
modification.
modification,

Even
Rule

if

the

9, Third

Subject

Ordet

did

constitute

Judicial District Court

a

Rules of

Practice, was not in effect when the matter ^as presented to the
lower court.
Plaintiff waived any claim with respect to the absence of
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law inasmuch as such claim
was

not

raised

before

the

trial

court

at

the

hearing

on

Plaintiff's objections to the Subject Order and motion for new
trial.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of taw are not required

when the reasoning of the Court is apparent and the Order is
supported by the evidence.

Even if Findings and Conclusions were

required, the Subject Order is not invalidate^.
Point II Summary
Plaintiff has waived any claim that thej Subject Order does
not

accurately

reflect

the

Court's

deci$ion

on

visitation

inasmuch as such objection was not presented to the trial court.
Point III Summary
Plaintiff
award

of

waived

attorneys

Exhibit 7-D

any claim of error wjith respect
fees by

stipulating

to

the

to the

admission

of

(copies of attorney's billings)j and by failing to

raise any issue as to any reasonableness of the fees before the
4(a)

trial

court.

Inasmuch

as only

a fraction

of

the fees were

awarded, the reasonableness of the fees is not i n issue,
Point IV Summary
The Court
interpreting

followed

paragraphs

established
7 and

rules pf

construction

8 of the Decree,

and

and the lower

court's interpretation is supported by the weirding of the Decree
and any extrinsic evidence that may have been considered by the
lower court.

4(b)

because:

(a)

Said paragraphs constituted a modification of the

Decree in violation of Rule 9, Third District Court Rules of
Practice; and, (b)

the Court failed to enter Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law in support of paragraphs 1 and 4 of the
Subject Order.
A.

Compliance with Rule 9
The Subject Order was the result of a hearing on an Order to

Show Cause entered by the Court on March 2, 1987.

At that time,

the present version of Rule 9 upon which Plaintiff relies was not
in effect.

Thus, there was no necessity for filing a petition

for modification.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the

Subject Order constitutes a modification of the Decree with
respect to visitation, the Order to Show Cause properly brought
the issue before the trial court.
The current version of Rule 9, discussed by Plaintiff in her
brief, was not in effect until June 1, 1987.

Thus, on the date

that the Order to Show Cause was issued, arjd on the date of the
hearing on the Order to Show Cause, a modification did not need
to comply with the current version of Rule 9 as cited by
Plaintiff in her brief.
It is difficult to conceive of how paragraph 1 of the
Subject Order could be construed as a "modification" of the
Decree.

The Court made a decision to resolve a problem with

visitation by establishing a detailed visitation schedule to
avoid

"prior plans" claimed

by Plaintiff.

Moreover, the

structured visitation schedule is well yithin the scope of

"reasonable visitation".

Paragraph 1 of the Subject Order is

a

clarification of an existing Decree rather than a "modification"
of the Decree.
unnecessary.

Thus, a finding of changed circumstances was
Moreover,

the

interference

with

Defendant's

visitation, which has occurred since the date of the Decree, is a
material change if such a change is necessary.
Paragraph
paragraphs

4 of

7 and

the

Subject

Order,

which

8 of the Decree, cannot

interprets

be considered

a

"modification".

The Court merely resolved

interpretations.

The wording of paragraph 7 of the Decree was

not

changed

or modified,

it was clarified

the conflicting

and

construed.

Paragraph 7 and 8 of the Decree have the same meaning after
issuance of the Subject Order as they did prior to the issuance
of the Subject Order.

The Court merely rejected Plaintiff's

interpretation of those paragraphs.
B.

Findings of Fact
Plaintiff argues that paragraph

1 of the Subject Order

should be reversed because the lower court did not enter Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
All of Plaintiff's claims that the trial court should have
entered Findings and/or Conclusions on various issues have been
waived by Plaintiff inasmuch as such claims were never mentioned
or argued to the trial court.

It is well established that a

party may not raise issues on appeal that were not presented in
the lower court.

Paffel vs. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986);

English vs. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977); Lane vs. Messer,
6

732 P . 2d 4flM i l! tah

1 986 ); Bundy vs. Century Equipment Company,

6 9 2 P . 2 - 1 7 ,: <4 i i"i ,>|. i QM'M ) .
The

entry

of

paragraph

Fi ndings
-'*

and

Subjec*

Concl us ions

'rdor

mnece?? •-"
• • • - . - , •

Cour

s dec . <; .n„

defendant

assertec

unjustifiably denying visitatio.
pi: :I c i: pi ai is

Tl n

obvious

visitation schedule .*.

The decisions

• • i*

- . . .

t

i

<

:

i

-^he

-

, *-

.-I ue tailed

.ive a-ivancf« notice

-

*

.

.

Ar.yune

sol . t ; ^n w?° -*-^ . - ^uht-

*- Supreme Court

.

- i

of

uiaiming

''.<:* Plaint i f-*

of visitation and thereh\

presumption that

*

i i I support

nui-j that

.

tnei

-

considered all relevant e/icir

.affel v^~ Paffel,
1986);

Walker vs. Walker,

claiming error I iy
• fiii I 1.1 ui<: I usiuii in
Ibid.

+

«

~~

^°"' ".2d

* .. - *

-

-r;-+ *

-

in in

i 9Bc •

leuu". .,L;;U

Plaintiff has completely failer *

party

enter
^nis

• •.:

presumption.

rebut this presumption.

The case ±aw further holds that il 111 M nv i denrc' njbmi t t I-M| ! i
tl :ie Court supports the Courtf s decisioi I, F i ridings and Conclusions
are not required.
supra.

Paffel vs. Paffel

^upra; Walker vs. Walker,

I'

court: supporter

. w • * -:;
;,,«-- decision

reflected

•

*-w • -1--- ' - "•

in paragraph

* re

Subject Order.
"Iti*'1 ?-M"
to

paragraph

J

-ii'l l'',i I" ji'i'" u n n e c e s s a r y
*

Subject

determination was involved.

Order

Constructic
7

inasmuch

wi th respect
<

-o

* actual.

a matter of law.

Even if it be assumed, for the sake of

argument, that paragraph 4 of the Subject Order involved a
determination of fact, the principles noted in the Paffel and
Walker estciblish that findings are unnecessary.
A Conclusion of Law in support of paragraph 4 of the Subject
Order is unnecessary inasmuch as the Court's decision is readily
apparent from the Order itself.

The only possible Conclusion of

Law would be a verbatim quotation of the Order.
Assuming

for the sake of argument

that

Findings

and

Conclusions should have been entered, the remedy is not reversal
of the Subject Order.

The proper remedy would be to remand the

case to the lower court with instructions to enter Findings and
Conclusions.
Plaintiff

In order to obtain a reversal of the order,

has

the

burden

of

proving

that

there

was

a

misunderstanding or a misapplication of the law that resulted in
substantial and prejudicial error, or that the evidence clearly
preponderated

against the decisions of the Court or that a

serious inequity resulted so as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion.

English vs. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977).

Mere

failure to enter Findings or Conclusions does not make the order
invalid.
II.
THE SUBJECT ORDER ACCURATELY STATES THE
SUBSTANCE OF THE COURT'S RULING
Plaintiff asserts that paragraphs 1(b), (d), (e), (f), (g)
and (h) do not accurately reflect the substance of the Court's

8

oral decision In the matter.
in l-hiri! regard,
(Apr..

in -!,/: I ,

'"I'II

supported

aragraph.

by 1 he record
' i l l ni I f i nil II

(

ni i t tm

: . .?7, 1 »

(March Tr
out

lie

I hi 111

II ln>

i'

Although
i j i I "' 'i

I 11 11 II

paragraph
decision,

paragraph 1(g) specifies less visitation than the Court

ordered

so that Plaintiff has no cause to complain.
T'lht"'1'

.-

of the father

rplates to v i s : tat .on

t

Father s ,J.S" paragraph

two (2) hour^ -•!- Christmas 1: r
] (f)) ai id "\ . .-t.c:" .

no

isitat. ion

*, oven numbered

.--

: r

'..-r-it;:

.ou r c on the child's birthday

' ..

(paragraph l ( h
Xt

1

:

1 I'M '

arguments were presented

-^ „.- ai

1 i ill) "'

I lie

i: LOS 11 nj

Ap11.1. '"), 1987, a dr n t: f

of the Subject Order containing the detailed visitation schedule
i .Vis

17.5)

id

the

hiiiiii I'1;;

,o

ridiiiL-Lil. "' s

auomtsy

I Apr. i.i.

Tr

&

The draft contained the exact language of tr^.e final Order

except as to additional items discussed at Lae neari . .

r

.

During that hearing, Plaintiff's attorney noted -.il. .-f * s,tproblems with respect: to the proposed Orde r ( Apr i 1 Tr
items of w! licl I P] ainti ff now complains were not mentis nti Apr.,
Tr. 17-18)

Thus, Plaintiff has waived the objections.

Paffel

vs. Paffel, supr a; English v s . .*-.L*i.^*., supra; Lane vs. Messer,
supra; Bundy v s . Century Equipment Company, supra.
Even if the objections had not been waived,
9

the items of

which Plaintiff complains are fair and reasonable.

Moreover, it

must be presumed, unless there is evidence to the contrary, that
Judge Young read the Subject Order at the time it was signed and
approved of the items of which Plaintiff now complains.

See

Paffel vs. Paffel, supra; Walker vs. Walker, supra.
With respect to the Christmas visitation (paragraph 1(f)),
Plaintiff's standing to complain is questionable.

The visitation

specified in the Order is much less than orally directed by the
Court (March Tr. 27).
III.
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEB
Plaintiff asserts that the award of attorneys fees should be
reversed

because there was no evidence that the fees were

reasonable.

This issue, like many other

issues raised by

Plaintiff in this appeal, is raised for the first time before
this Court.

During the course of the March evidentiary hearing,

Plaintiff made no suggestion of any issue of reasonableness of
fees.
The evidence on attorneys fees was submitted to the Court in
the form of an exhibit which was marked as Exhibit 7-D (March Tr,
10-12).

At that the conclusion of the hearing, Plaintiff made no

objection with respect to the admission of Exhibit 7-D.

In this

regard, note the following quotation from page 32 of the March
Transcript:
"Judge Young:...Let me ask, before we go
formally into recess, we did not enter the
exhibits. Do you wish them to be -

10

Mr. McDonald:
I would
evidence, your Honor.
Judge Young:
exhibits?

Any

offer

objection

them
to

into
those

Ms. Corporon:
I still haven't had an
opportunity to look at them, youtf Honor. I
assume they are summary exhibits of his
testimony. I don't have any objection, your
Honor.
Judge Young:

They will be received.

(Where upon, Defendant's Exhibits 1-8 were
offered and received into evidence.) (March
Tr. 32).
It should further be noted that the is^bue of reasonableness
of the fees is irrelevant inasmuch as only a fraction of the fees
were awarded.

Exhibit 7-D established fees Incurred by Defendant

in the sum of $3,340.75.

The total award cff attorneys fees was

only $500.00.
At no time during the hearing did Plaintiff question the
reasonableness of the attorneys fees noted in Exhibit 7-D
IV.
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPHS 7 AND 8
OF THE ORIGINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff

contends

that the Court committed

error in

interpreting the provisions of paragraphs 7 ^nd 8 of the original
Decree.
Plaintiff's argument is based upon thrjee totally unfounded
assumptions: (a)

the Court ignored the rjjles of construction

established in various Supreme Court cases;

(b)

the Court was

unable to ascertain the intent of the parties from the wording of
11

the Decree; (c)

the Court relied on extrinsic evidence to

determine the intent of the parties.
It is apparent that the Court closely followed the rules of
construction as set forth in Utah Valley Bank vs. Tanner, 636
P. 2d 1060 (Utah 1981).

That rule of construction requires that

the Court first attempt to ascertain the intent of the parties
from the wording of the instrument.

It is only when the intent

cannot be determined from the wording of the instrument that the
Court turns to extrinsic evidence.
It makes no difference whether the Court determined the
intent of the parties from the wording of the Decree or from
evidence proffered by the parties.

In either event, the result

is the same.
A. Determination of Intent From Wording of Decree
The intent of the parties is apparent from an analysis of
the wording of paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Decree.

The wording of

paragraphs 7 and 8 is as follows:
"7.
Plaintiff is awarded the real property
of the marriage in the form of a home located
at 2740 East 4510 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah, subject to a lien thereon for one-half
of the equity that may be in the house at the
time of liquidation (which contemplates an
increasing equity as the value increases).
The equity is defined as the fair market
value or sales price at the time Defendant
becomes entitled to liquidate his lien as set
forth herein, less the amount of mortgages,
costs of improvements made by Plaintiff and
costs of sale.
This lien shall not be
forecloseable until the youngest child
reaches 18, or until the home is sold or
until Plaintiff remarries. On the occurrence
of any of these events, two-thirds of the
house payments then made shall be converted
12

to child support an that sum shall be paid to
t h e P l a i n t i f f on a monthly basis as

additional child support.

8. Defendant is ordered to continue making
the payments on the home.
Defendant shall
also be entitled to take the entire interest
portion of the house payment as ja deduction
for himself as well as three (3)| income tax
exemptions on the children with Pjlaintiff to
receive one exemption on the youhgest child
at the present time." (Emphasis added).
Plaintiff remarried

in August, 1984 (March Tr. 15.10).

Thereafter, she and her new husband resided in the former marital
domicile for approximately one year (March Tr. 15.14) and then
arranged for tenants to occupy the home (Marjch Tr. 15.19).
Plaintiff contends that paragraph 7 |means that upon her
remarriage or sale of the family home, Defendant's obligations
for support increase because Defendant niust continue making
mortgage payments on the home where she and her new husband
resided (an impossibility if the home is sold) and Defendant must
also increase child support payments in an |amount equal to twothirds of the mortgage payment.
Defendant contends that paragraph 7 means upon Plaintiff's
remarriage or upon sale of the home, his obligations decrease in
that he no longer is obligated to make the mortgage payment, but
pays a greater amount of child support in la sum equal to twothirds of the mortgage payment (adjusted for children reaching
the age of majority and children who thereafter reside with
Defendant).
An

analysis

of

the

wording

of

the

Decree

in

the

circumstances under which the underlying contract was negotiated,
13

clearly demonstrates that Defendant interpretation is correct.
The parties could not have intended the interpretation
asserted by Plaintiff.

Under Plaintiff's contention, when the

home is sold (an event in the same category as her remarriage),
Defendant must continue to make the mortgage payment.

Obviously,

such an interpretation cannot stand inasmuch as after a sale of
the home, there would be no mortgage payment.

Thus, it is

apparent that the parties intended that upon the occurrence of
any one of the events in paragraph

7 such as

Plaintiff's

remarriage or the sale of the home, Defendant's obligation to
make the mortgage payment would cease and his child support
obligations would increase in an amount equal to two-thirds of
the mortgage payment previously made.
It is common knowledge that when a divorced woman remarries
she thereby obtains an additional source of support through the
earning capacity of her new husband.

Such an obvious fact was

apparent to parties at the time they negotiated the agreement
underlying the Decree.

In such a circumstance, it would be

logical to assume that any adjustment conditional upon remarriage
would result in a decrease of support rather than an increase.
At that

the time the parties negotiated

the contract

underlying the Decree, it would be ludicrous to assume that
Defendant intended to provide a residence for Plaintiff's new
husband in the event of remarriage.

Thus, it is logical to

conclude that when a divorce decree dictates a change upon
remarriage of the wife, the parties did not intend that the
14

former husband would pay for the residence ojf the new husband.
In construing
logical meaning.

the Decree, words shbuld be given their
In this regard, Defendant calls the Court's

attention to the word "converted".

According to Webster's New

Collegiate Dictionary, 1974 edition, the word "converted" means
"...to change from one form to another" anq "...to exchange for
an equivalent".

On the basis of this definition, if two-thirds

of the house payment is "converted" to child support, there can
no longer be a house payment.
Any

logical

view

of

the

situation

would

demand

the

i

construction placed upon paragraphs 7 and 8 j by the Court.

It is

apparent that the parties, in the face of Plaintiff's remarriage,
were making adjustments for the pre-marria^je tax consequences.
If Plaintiff is making the mortgage payments \ he is entitled to a
deduction for the portion attributable to iriterest.

At or about

the time that the underlying contract was negotiated, Plaintiff
was receiving a tax benefit equal to approximately one-third of
the mortgage payment.

It is apparent that the parties intended

the conversion from house payment to child support to equalize
the after tax impact on Defendant.
B. Determination of Intent from Extrinsic Evidence
1

Even if it be assumed, for the sake of argument, that the
lower Court turned to extrinsic evidence to ctonstrue paragraphs 7
and 8 of the Decree, the Court was not boundj to accept the selfserving statements of Plaintiff especially When such statements
are totally outside the realm of reason land contradicted by
15

Defendant's evidence.

Plaintiff contended that Defendant agreed

to continue to make the house payment so as to benefit from a
"real estate investment".

Obviously, no person would consent to

an "investment" whereby such person would pay the entire cost and
receive half of the value.
Defendant proffered evidence contrary to the evidence that
was untimely submitted by Plaintiff in her affidavit filed after
the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing.

Defendant proffered

that the negotiations leading up to the agreement upon which the
Decree was based
Plaintiff's

centered

upon

the proposition

that upon

remarriage Defendant's overall obligation would

decrease in an amount equal to one-third of the house payment
(March Tr. 4.25);

that Defendant did not intend

to provide

support to Plaintiff's new husband (March Tr. 5.11); and, that
since Defendant had a substantial investment

in the home, he

would continue to make the house payment as a credit against
child support (March Tr. 6.10).

Had it not been for the untimely

proffer evidence by Plaintiff, Defendant would have proffered
additional evidence of intent (See April Tr. 7-8).

However, the

evidence that was proffered by Defendant clearly supports the
decision of the lower court.
With respect to Plaintiff's claim of error in failing to
enter

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

of

Law, Defendant

incorporates by reference his arguments set forth in Section I of
this brief.

16

CONCLUSION
The majority of points raised by Plaintiff in her brief are
raised for the first time on appeal.

The few issues that were

submitted to the trial court were properly determined.

Plaintiff

has totally failed to demonstrate a basis for reversal on any
issue

raised

in

her

brief,

i.e.,

[that

there

was

a

misunderstanding or a misapplication of the law resulting in
substantial and prejudicial error, or thfrt the decision was
clearly against the preponderance of the evidence or that a
serious inequity resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion.

English vs. English, supra.'

On these grounds,

Defendant submits that the Subject Order should be affirmed in
its entirety.
DATED this

*1P*

day of June, 1988.

Robert M. McDonald
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of June, 1988, I

served -a true and accurate -edpy of the foregoing Respondent's
Brief upon the following named persons by depositing

said

document in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as
follows:
Craig M. Peterson
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake CityX UT 8
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APR ;•> I -987
Robert M. McDonald, (#2175)
Attorney for Defendant
American Plaza III
47 West 200 South, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 359-0999
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF] SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

josh vff

oooOooo
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

-vs-

Civil No. D-80-931

CASS BETTINGER,
,.r.

••)

«

i!**

\

Defendant.
oooOooo

The issues raised by the Order to ^how Cause

heretofore

issued by the Court, was heard before the Honorable David Young,
District Judge, on Tuesday, March 24, 19 87.

Present at said

hearing were Robert M. McDonald representing defendant and Mary
Corporon representing plaintiff.

The Court having heard

the

testimony and proffers submitted by the respective parties, and
having heard the arguments of counsel, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Defendant shall have the right to visit the child born

of the marriage, Nicole, age 10, at the following times:
(a)

Every other weekend beginning on Friday

evening at 5:00 p.m. and ending Sunday evening at
6:00 p.m.;
1

(b)

Visitation on one weekday fcj>r a period of

three hours during those weeks when tljiere is no weekend
visitation and said visitation shall take place on
Wednesday of such week unless defendant designates
a different date on or before Sunday d>f said week;
(c)

Summer vacation visitation for a period of

six weeks during the

months of June, July and August of

each calendar year the dates to be designated by
defendant;
(d)

Visitation on every Father'^ Day for a period

of six hours designated by defendant;
(e)

During even numbered calendar years holiday

visitation for eight hours to be designated by
defendant on New Year's Day, Easter, Independence
Day, Labor Day and Thanksgiving and ir^ odd numbered
calendar years on President's Day, Memorial Day,
Pioneer Day, Veterans Day and Christmas Day;
(f)

During odd numbered calendar years when

defendant does not have visitation fot the entire
Christmas Day, defendant shall have visitation for a
period of two hours on Christmas Day;
(g)

Visitation for an entire 6aj/ during the

child's Christmas holiday, the date tc|> be designated by
defendant;
(h)

Visitation for two hours on m e child's

birthday.
Defendant shall notify plaintiff on or before the Thursday prior
to weekend visitation if defendant will b4 unable to exercise
such weekend visitation.
2.

Plaintiff

shall

not

in any

njanner, directly

or

indirectly, impair plaintiff from making telephone contact with
the minor child, Nicole.

Plaintiff shall u^e her best efforts to

facilitate and encourage telephone contact between defendant and
said child.
3.

Control of the former family hom^ located at 2740 East

4510 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, shall forthwith be transferred
to defendant.

In this regard, plainti |Ef shall

immediately

deliver to defendant keys to all locks in; the home and keys to
all locks on appurtenant structures and a c0py of the most recent
listing agreement.

Thereafter, defendant shall have full and

exclusive

authority

terminate

listing

supervise

and

to:

(a) negotiate^

agreements with

control

any

execute, amend, or

respect

activity

ob

to the home;
arrangement

(b)

deemed

necessary by defendant to facilitate the iale of the home; (c)
negotiate, arrange or terminate any interirt^ rental agreement with
respect to the home; (d) make any arrangement, improvement or
repair which defendant feels will facilitate sale of the home to
be paid

from the proceeds of sale of

the house.

Provided,

however, that the home shall not be sold except at a price and
upon terms acceptable to both parties.

Inj the event the parties

cannot agree as to the selling price or terms of sale, the matter
shall be submitted to the Court.
4.

Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divojrce heretofore entered

in this action

is construed

as follows:

upon

plaintiff's

remarriage, defendant is relieved from any further obligation to
make the monthly installment payments on the mortgage on the
family home, but defendant's obligation fdr child support shall
be increased in a sum equal to two-thirds ojif the monthly mortgage
payment.

By reason of defendant's equity ijin said home, defendant

shall have the option to make the monthly installment payment on
the family home and shall receive full cr4dit against his child
support obligations.
5.

The judgment heretofore entered

by the Court on or

about March 24, 1986, in the principal sum bf $2,705.50 is hereby
vacated and set aside.
6,

The Court finds that defendant i^ current with respect

to all obligations for child support up t<t> and including March
31, 1987.
1.

Judgment

is hereby entered, in flavor of defendant and

against plaintiff in the sum of $500.00 representing a portion of
the costs and attorney's fees incurred by defendant in obtaining
this Order.
8.

Inasmuch

orthodontic

bill,

as plaintiff
the dispute

resolved.
4

has paid
relating

and discharged
thereto

has

the
been

DATED th is fip- day of April, 1987.

A ir T*
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r*. -/-

H. Di'*OW H**XIY
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

IAT^..

•*pm* Ctark

I hereby certify that on the

Q

dky of April, 1987, I

served a true and accurate copy of an Order upon plaintiff by
depositing said copy in the United States Mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to the following:
Mary C. Corporon
Attorney at Law
Corporon & Williams
1100 Boston Building
Salt Lake City; Utah

C.

5

84111

